Summary. Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP ) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (M AX) an indifferent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (M IN ) an indifferent agent does not get a unit of good.
more agents are served. Specifically, for any subset of agents S consider a vector of nonnegative payments x S ∈ [0, ∞] N that are zero for all agents not in S. A collection of payments is cross-monotonic if the payments are weakly inclusion decreasing. Given a cross-monotonic collection of payments, we construct the mechanism as follows. For a report of utilities allocate S * at cost x S * , where S * is the largest coalition of agents such that everyone in S * is willing to pay x S * to get service -this coalition exists by cross-monotonicity of the payments. The mechanisms that satisfy GSP and M IN are the sequential mechanisms (Theorem 2). Loosely speaking, consider any binary tree of size n such that to every node is attached exactly one agent and any path from the root to a terminal node goes through all agents exactly once. At every decision node we also attach a nonnegative price. Given this tree, we construct the mechanism as follows. First we offer service to the root agent at the price attached to his node. We proceed on the right branch from the root if service is purchased and on the left branch if it is not. The key restriction on prices is that for any two nodes to which the same agent is attached, the price on the winning node is not smaller than that on the losing node.
3 Surprisingly, the (welfarewise) intersection of sequential and cross-monotonic mechanisms is almost empty. It contains only the fixed cost mechanisms (Corollary 1), offering to each agent a price completely independent of the reports.
An important property of cross-monotonic mechanisms is to allow equal treatment of equals, which no other GSP mechanism does (Proposition 2). On the negative side, when there are only k units of good available, k < n, cross-monotonic mechanisms must exclude n − k agents from the mechanism, that is they will never be served at any profile (see section 6.3). By contrast, not all sequential mechanisms exclude agents ex-ante. In fact, only the priority mechanisms, where agents are offered sequentially a unit of good at a fixed price until someone accepts the offer, meet GSP and allocate at most one unit of good at any profile (Proposition 3).
We do not make an actual cost function part of the definition of a mechanism. That is, we place no constraint on the total cost shares collected from the agents who are served. Thus our characterization results of GSP mechanisms are entirely orthogonal to budget balance and other feasibility requirements (such as bounds on the budget surplus or deficit). Naturally, one of the first questions we ask about the class of mechanisms identified in theorems 1 and 2 is when can they be chosen so as to cover exactly a given cost function. In examples 7 and ?? we answer these questions under a weak symmetry assumption. In this way, we recover most mechanisms identified in the earlier literature.
Related literature
There is some interesting literature in the design of GSP mechanisms for assignment problems of heterogeneous goods when money is not available (Ehlers[2002] , Ehlers et al.[2003] , Papai [2000 Papai [ , 2001 and Svensson et al.[2002] ). Unfortunately, this literature usually charac-terizes mechanisms with poor equity properties (e.g. dictatorial mechanisms). By contrast, the class of GSP mechanism when money is available is very rich (see below).
The design of GSP cost sharing mechanisms for heterogeneous goods was first discussed by Moulin[1999] and Moulin and Shenker[2001] . When the cost function is submodular (concave), cross-monotonic mechanisms are characterized by GSP , budget balance, voluntary participation, nonnegative transfers and strong consumer sovereignty. 4 Roughgarden et al. [2006a, 2006b ], Pa'l et al. [2003] and Immorlica et al.[2005] consider cross-monotonic mechanisms when the cost function is not submodular. Roughgarden et al. [2006] uses submodular cross-monotonic mechanisms to approximate budget balance when the actual cost function is not submodular. Immorlica et al. [2005] shows that new cross-monotonic mechanisms emerge when consumer sovereignty is relaxed.
The sequential mechanisms of our Theorem 2 are discussed by Moulin[1999] who imposes budget balance for a supermodular (convex) cost function. Theorem 1 there asserts wrongly that all GSP mechanisms meeting budget balance, voluntary participation, nonnegative transfers and strong consumer sovereignty charge successively marginal cost following an independent ordering of the agents. We correct this erroneous statement in example 8.
Roughgarden et al. [2007] uncovers a very clever class of weakly GSP mechanisms that are neither cross-monotonic nor sequential (see also Devanur et al.[2005] ). This class contains sequential and cross-monotonic mechanisms, as well as hybrid mechanisms. They apply these mechanisms to the vertex cover and Steiner tree cost sharing problems to improve the efficiency of algorithms derived from cross-monotonic mechanisms. A closely related paper is the companion paper Juarez[2007b] developing a model where indifferences are ruled out. For instance, agents report an irrational number and payments are rational. It turns out that the class of GSP mechanisms becomes very large. In particular, it contains mechanisms very different to cross-monotonic and sequential mechanisms (and also those discussed by Roughgarden et al.[2007] ). Juarez[2007b] provides three equivalent characterizations of the GSP mechanism in this economy, two of which are generalizations of the cross-monotonic and sequential mechanisms discussed in this paper.
When a cost function is specified, an important question is to evaluate the trade-offs between efficiency and budget balance. Moulin and Shenker[2001] discuss this issue for budget balanced cross-monotonic mechanisms when the underlying cost function is submodular. In particular, they find that the cross-monotonic Shapley value mechanism, where the payment of a coalition equals its stand alone cost, minimizes the worst absolute surplus loss. 5 Juarez [2007a] analyzes similar trade-offs for supermodular cost functions. Contrary to the submodular case, one can construct optimal sequential mechanisms that cuts the efficiency loss by half with respect to the optimal budget balanced mechanism.
Finally a result by Goldberg et al.[2004] on fixed cost mechanisms is closely related to our Corollary 1. It characterizes these mechanisms under a strengthening of GSP , where agents can coalitionally manipulate by misreporting, transferring goods and money between them.
The model
For a vector x ∈ R M , we denote by x S the projection of x over S ⊂ M. Let 1 M be the unitarian vector in R M , that is 1 M = (1, 1, . . . , 1). There is a finite number of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Every agent has a utility (willingness to pay) for getting one unit of good. Let u ∈ R N + be the vector of these utilities. Therefore, if agent i gets a unit paying x i , his net utility is u i − x i . If he does not get a unit his net utility is zero.
Definition 1 A mechanism (G, ϕ) allocates to every vector of utilities u a coalition of agents who get goods G(u) ⊆ N and the cost shares (payments) ϕ(u) ∈ R N + such that:
The definition above includes familiar constraints previously discussed in the literature. For instance, we restrict the attention to non-negative mechanisms, requiring for all cost shares to be positive or zero. This is a common assumption when no transfers between agents are allowed and we do not want to subsidize any of them. The mechanisms will also meet individual rationality, which implies that all agents enter the mechanism voluntarily. That is, if an agent is served then he will never pay more than his utility (condition ii). On the other hand, because we study non-negative mechanisms, individual rationality implies the agents with zero utility should pay nothing (condition i).
The net utility of agent i in the mechanism (G, ϕ), denoted by
Let N U (u) be the vector of such net utilities. Notice two different mechanisms may be welfarewise equivalent, that is their net utilities at any profile be equal.
We want to characterize the mechanisms that are group strategyproof. That is, we want to rule out coordinated misreports by group of agents. If a group of agents misrepresent their preferences with at least one agent in the group strictly profiting, then another agent in the group will lose. Definition 2 (Group strategyproofness) A mechanism (G, ϕ) is group strategyproof (GSP) if for all T ⊂ N, and all utility profiles u and u such that
We define next our two systematic continuity conditions. Similar continuity conditions have been used in other models, for instance Deb and Razzolini[1999] . These are tractability conditions that allow us to get close-form mechanisms. Nevertheless, these conditions can be easily interpreted, see below.
Definition 3
• Upper continuity (Maximalist tie-breaking rule (M AX)). A mechanism (G, ϕ) satisfies M AX if for any i, u −i ∈ R N \i + , and u
• Lower continuity (Minimalist tie-breaking rule (M IN )). A mechanism (G, ϕ) satisfies M IN if for any i, u −i ∈ R N \i + , and u
In the space of strategyproof mechanisms, upper and lower continuity can be interpreted as tie-breaking rules. Upper continuity (MAX) serves the agents who are indifferent between getting or not getting a unit of good, whereas lower continuity (MIN) does not serve the indifferent agents. To see this, consider a SP mechanism. Then, there exist arbitrary pricing functions
. . , n, such that at the utility profile u, agent i is offered a unit of good at price In a cross-monotonic set of cost shares, there is exactly one set of cost-shares for every coalition S. We interpret x S as the payment when the agents in S, and only them, are served. The key feature of a cross-monotonic set of cost shares is that they do not increase as the coalition increases. This implies that for every utility profile u the set of reachable coalitions, F (u) = {S ∈ 2 N | x S ≤ u}, has a maximum element with respect to the inclusion ⊆. To see this, notice if S, T ∈ F (u) then by cross-monotonicity S ∪ T ∈ F (u).
Definition 5 A mechanism (G, ϕ) is cross-monotonic if there exists a cross-monotonic set of cost shares χ N such that for all u ∈ R N + : G(u) is the maximum reachable coalition at u and ϕ(u) = x G(u) .
Theorem 1 A mechanism satisfies GSP and M AX if and only if it is cross-monotonic.
In an economy without indifferences, cross-monotonic mechanisms are also characterized by GSP and monotonicity in size, that is if u ≤ũ then G(u) ⊆ G(ũ). See Juarez[2007b] for details.
Given a cross-monotonic set of cost shares χ N , we can also implement the truthful outcome of the cross-monotonic mechanism by playing the following demand game proposed by Moulin[1999] . We offer agents in N units of good at price x N . If all of they accept it, then everyone is served at prices x N . If only agents in S accept, then we remove agents in N \ S from the game and offer agents in S units of good at price x S . Continue similarly until all of the agents in a coalition accepted or every agent in N was removed from the game.
Example 1 (Cross-monotonic mechanisms for n = 1, 2) The one agent mechanisms can be described by a constant x, x ∈ [0, ∞]. The agent gets a unit and pays x if his utility is bigger than or equal to x. He does not get a unit and pays nothing otherwise. The two agent mechanisms should be generated by a cross-monotonic set of cost shares.
(see figure 1) . By M AX, the level set of {1, 2} is closed. The borders between the level sets of {1} and ∅, and {2} and ∅, should belong to the {1} and {2} respectively. Example 2 Immorlica et al. [2005] proposes an example where exactly one agent pays a positive amount when a coalition of agents is served. This example relaxes a key strong consumer sovereignty condition on Moulin[1999] result, therefore is not captured by Moulin's mechanisms. However, it is captured by our class of cross-monotonic mechanisms. For a submodular cost function C : 2 N → R + , order the agent arbitrary, say i 1 i 2 · · · i n . Offer the agents, following this order, a unit of good at the cost of himself and the agents after him. The mechanism ends when someone accepts the offer or when we have made an offer to every agent. That is, agent i 1 will be offer a unit at price C(i 1 , . . . , i n ). If he accepts, the mechanism ends there. If he rejects, we offer agent i 2 a unit of good at price C(i 2 , . . . , i n ), and so on. The cross-monotonic set of cost shares that implements this mechanism is x S i * = C(D i * ) and x S j = 0 for all j = i * , where i * is the maximal element in S and D * i is the set that contains i * and all agents dominated by i * with .
Sequential mechanisms and M IN
Definition 6 A sequential tree is a binary tree of length n such that:
i. at every node there is exactly one agent in N and a price in [0, ∞],
ii. every path from the root to a terminal node contains all agents in N exactly once.
Definition 7 (Sequential mechanisms) Given a sequential tree we construct a sequential mechanisms as follows:
We offer the agent in the root of the tree a unit of good at the price of his node. If his utility is strictly bigger than the offered price, then we allocate him a unit at this price and go right on the tree. If his utility is smaller than or equal to the offered price then we do not allocate him a unit and go left on the tree. We continue similarly with the following agent until we reach the end of the tree. Consider the sequential tree of figure 2(a) and the mechanism (G, ϕ) that it implements. If the utility profile u is such that u 1 > w, u 2 > y and u 3 ≤ d then the outcome is G(u) = {1, 2} and ϕ(u) = (w, y, 0).
On the other hand, ifũ is such thatũ 1 ≤ w,ũ 2 > x andũ 3 ≤ b then G(ũ) = {2} and ϕ(ũ) = (0, x, 0).
Sequential mechanisms are not always group strategyproof. For instance, consider the mechanism generated by the sequential tree of figure 2(a). If y < x, then when the true utility profile is such that u 1 = w and u 2 > y, agent 1 can help agent 2 by reporting a utility bigger than w, whereby agent 2 is offered a unit at a cheaper price. However, these mechanisms are weakly group strategyproof, that is if a coalition of agents successfully misreports, then at least one agent in this coalition is indifferent. Definition 10 gives the exact conditions under which a sequential tree will generate a GSP mechanism.
Given a sequential tree, consider any path in the tree and a non terminal node ζ in this path. We say ζ is losing (winning) on this path if the edge in the path that follows ζ is a left (right) edge. For instance, the path [1w, 2y, 3c] in figure 2(a) contains one winning node and one losing node. 1w is winning and 2y is losing.
One useful path is from the root of the tree to a node. We denote by P 0 (ζ) this path starting at node ζ. For instance, in figure 2(a), P 0 (3c) = [1w, 2y, 3c], P 0 (3d) = [1w, 2y, 3d] and P 0 (2x) = [1w, 2x].
Notice the intersection of two paths from the root of the tree is also a path from the root of the tree. We use to denote it. For instance, in figure 2(a), P 0 (3c) P 0 (3d) = [1w, 2y]. Notice this intersection may also lead to the degenerated path that contains only the root of the tree, for instance P 0 (2x) P 0 (2y) = [1w].
Definition 8 Let ζ and ζ two nodes in a sequential tree. We say the node ζ is on the left of ζ if the terminal node of P 0 (ζ) P 0 (ζ ) is losing on P 0 (ζ) and winning on P 0 (ζ ). Given a node ζ and an agent i ∈ P 0 (ζ), we denote by x ζ i the price of agent i in the path P 0 (ζ). Definition 9 (Realizability by indifferent agents) Consider a sequential tree and two nodes ζ and ζ in the tree. We say ζ is realizable by indifferent agents from ζ if (a) ζ is on the left of ζ , (b) there is a utility profile that visits ζ, and (c) there is a group of indifferent agents S who can increase their utility profile without increasing their payment and visit the node ζ .
That is, there is a utility profile u that visits the node ζ, a group of agents S such that u S = x ζ S ≥ x ζ S and the profile (ũ S , u −S ) visits ζ for someũ S > u S .
Two nodes are realizable by indifferent agents if there is a group of agents who can increase their utility without increasing their payment and visit the second node. For instance, consider the tree in figure 2(a) . The node 3d is realizable by indifferent agents from 3b whenever x and y are finite. To see this, consider the utility profile u = (w, u 2 , u 3 ) such that u 2 > max{x, y}. Clearly, u visits 3b. Ifũ 1 > w then the profile (ũ 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) visits 3d.
On the other hand, if y ≤ x, then the node 3c cannot be realizable be indifferent agents from 3b. This is because at any utility profile that realizes 3b, the utility u 2 of agent 2 is such that u 2 > x ≥ y. Therefore agent 2 will always be served independent on the utility of agent 1.
Realizability by indifferent agents capture the nodes where indifferent agents can increase their utility without increasing their payment. We are especialy interested in realizability by indifferent of agents of nodes with a common agent.
Definition 10 A sequential tree is feasible if for any nodes ζ and ζ with a common agent k such that ζ is realizable by indifferent agents from ζ, x
We say a sequential mechanism is feasible if it is implemented by a feasible sequential tree.
A sufficient condition for feasibility is that for any two nodes that contain the same agent, the price of the node in the left is not smaller than the price of the node in the right. This condition is necessary when there are at most three agents (see examples 4 and 5). Example 6 shows this is not necessary when there are more than three agents. We now characterize the collection of sequential trees that are feasible.
Proposition 1 A sequential tree is feasible if and only if for any two nodes ζ and ζ with a common agent k such that ζ is on the left of ζ : If x ζ k > x ζ k , then there exist nodesζ ∈ P 0 (ζ) andζ ∈ P 0 (ζ ) with a common agent i and:
(a)ζ is losing in P 0 (ζ),ζ is winning in P 0 (ζ ) and
Feasibility is a neccesary condition of a sequential mechanism that is GSP. Indeed, consider two nodes ζ and ζ as in definition 10 above and assume that x ζ k > x ζ k . We see that the indifferent agents can help agent k by moving from node ζ to node ζ at some utility profile. Since ζ is realizable by indifferent agents from ζ, then there is a utility profile u that visits ζ and a group of indifferent agents S such that u S = x A two agents mechanism such that 2 has priority over 1, is shown in figure 3 . Agent 2 gets a unit of good at price x 2 if and only if u 2 > x 2 . If 2 gets a unit of good, then agent 1 gets a unit of good at price
On the other hand, if agent 2 did not get a unit of good, then agent 1 gets a unit of good at price The following example shows that any feasible sequential mechanism for three agents with finite prices can be represented by a sequential tree such that for any two nodes with a common agent, the price on the losing node is not larger than the price on the winning node. This property is true only for three or less agents. Example 6 provides a four agents example where this representation does not hold.
Example 5 (Feasible sequential mechanisms for n = 3) Assume there are three agents. Figure 2 shows sequential trees for three agents. Every node contains an agent from {1, 2, 3} and a nonnegative price.
On figure 2(a), a feasible sequential tree (assuming finite prices) implies:
To see this, consider nodes 2x and 2y. Since they are consecutive nodes, their paths to the root of the tree only differ in 2x and 2y respectively. Then, conditions (a) and (b) cannot be satisfied. Hence x ≤ y.
Similarly, a ≤ b and c ≤ d are satisfied by comparing nodes 3a and 3b, and 3c and 3d respectively.
On the other hand, by comparing nodes 3a and 3c, conditions (a) and (b) are not satisfied because 2x and 2y are both losing. Hence a ≤ c. Similarly b ≤ d. Now consider the nodes 3b and 3c. If x < y, then condition (a) is not satisfied because 2y is not winning. Condition (b) is not satisfied because x < y. Therefore it cannot be that b > c. Hence
Finally, assume x = y. From the argument given above,
If b ≤ c then for every two nodes with the same agent, the price on the losing node is smaller than the price on the winning node.
On the other hand, if b > c then because agents 1 and 2 have priority, we can exchange their order on the tree. This will look like figure 4. With this order, for every two nodes with the same agent, the price on the losing node is smaller than the price on the winning node. Now consider the figure 2(b). Then feasibility of the tree (assuming finite prices) requires that a ≤ b ≤ y and x ≤ c ≤ d. That is for every two nodes with the same agent, the price on the losing node is smaller than the price on the winning node. To see this, by comparing nodes 3a and 3b, and 2c and 2d, we get (similarly to example above) that a ≤ b and c ≤ d respectively.
Now we compare nodes 3b and 3y. Then there is no common agent in their path to the root, thus conditions (a) and (b) cannot be satisfied.
Similarly, by comparing nodes 2x and 2c, x ≤ c. Hence Example 6 Consider the mechanism generated by the sequential tree of figure 5 (agents are in the rectangles). For every two nodes with the same agent, the price on the losing node is not bigger than the price on the winning node, except for nodes (4 10) and (4 9). At these nodes, their paths to the root contain the common agent 2. This agent meets condition (b). Therefore this tree is feasible. However, the price on the losing node (4 10) is bigger than that on the winning node (4 9).
Since agents 1 and 2 have priority, we can also exchange their positions and leave agent agent 2 in the root. If this is the case, node (3 8 ) is on the left of (3 7). 6 Comparison between cross-monotonic and sequential mechanisms
The intersection of cross-monotonic and sequential mechanisms
There is a small class of mechanisms that are welfare equivalent to both a sequential and a cross-monotonic mechanism.
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Definition 11 A mechanism (G, ϕ) is a fixed cost mechanism if there exist x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ [0, ∞], such that for every utility profile u:
A fixed cost mechanism offers to agent i a unit of good at price x i . Indifferences are broken arbitrarily. That is, for the utility profile u, agent i is guaranteed a unit at price x i if u i > x i . Agent i does not get a unit if u i < x i . At u i = x i he may or may not get a unit.
Corollary 1 A mechanism is welfare equivalent to a cross-monotonic and a feasible sequential mechanism if and only if it is a fixed cost mechanism.
This result shows that the behavior of indifferences have a big impact on the class of GSP mechanism. But one can argue that indifferences are rare event, so that a better model is one where the domain of utilities and the class of mechanisms preclude indifferences. On such domain, the class of GSP mechanisms will contain many more mechanisms than the sequential and cross-monotonic mechanisms. Juarez[2007b] analyzes such domain and characterizes the corresponding GSP mechanisms.
Equal treatment of equal agents
Definition 12 We say a mechanism satisfies equal treatment of equals (ETE) if for any u such that u i = u j , i ∈ G(u) then j ∈ G(u) and ϕ i (u) = ϕ j (u).
Proposition 2 A mechanism meets GSP and ET E if and only if it is welfare equivalent to a cross-monotonic mechanism with equal cost-shares. 8 This result is especially compelling when dividing costs that are symmetric. The subclass of cross-monotonic mechanism with equal cost-shares are the only GSP mechanisms meeting the basic equity requirement of ET E. This proposition rules out sequential mechanisms and also those GSP mechanisms discussed by Juarez[2007b] and Roughgarden[2007] .
The downside of this proposition is that many interesting applications have cost functions that are not symmetric (see for instance Roughgarden[2007] ), where ETE does not make sense.
Limited number of goods
When a social planner or seller has (can produce) less than n units of good, it is impossible to meet simultaneously ET E and GSP .
9 This is easy to check by looking at the utility profiles of the form (x, . . . , x), x > 0. By ET E, G(x, . . . , x) = ∅ for all x. Hence, by proposition 2 above and taking into account that the smallest cost share in a cross-monotonic mechanism is achieved when serving N, the mechanism should not allocate any unit at all.
Moreover, when there is scarcity of the good, cross-monotonic mechanisms exclude exante some agents from the mechanism.
10 That is, if only k units of good are available, k < n, then any cross-monotonic mechanism is such that n − k agents are not served at any profile. To see this, notice coalition N never gets service, therefore the cost shares of N should have at least one coordinate equal to ∞. Thus the agent i with such coordinate never participates in the game because his smallest payment is achieved when serving N . We remove this agent from the game and proceed similarly with the remaining coalition N \ i, until we have removed at least n − k agents.
On the other hand, there are many sequential mechanisms that do not ex-ante exclude any agent. If k ≥ 2, some easy combination of sequential and cross-monotonic mechanisms can be constructed.
Definition 13
Given an arbitrary order of the agents i 1 , . . . , i n and arbitrary prices (some of them may be infinity) x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , we define a priority mechanism as follows: Start with agent i 1 and offer him a unit of good at price x 1 . If he accepts the offer then the mechanism 8 A cross-monotonic mechanism with equal cost-shares is a cross-monotonic set of cost-shares that allocate the same payments at every set of cost-shares. That is, the cost-shares x S of the agents in S are such that x S i = x S j for all i, j ∈ S. 9 Except by the trivial mechanism that does not serve anyone at any profile. 10 We say a mechanism does not exclude ex-ante any agent if for every agent i there is a utility profile u i such that this agent is served. stops there. If he does not accept the offer, then continue with agent i 2 and offer him a unit of good at price x 2 . Continue similarly until some agent accepts the offer or we offered a unit to all agents.
Notice priority mechanisms are feasible sequential mechanisms for the feasible sequential tree such that agents are ordered linearly following the order i 1 , . . . , i n ; only the most leftist branch of the tree has prices equal to (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and any other node has a price equal to ∞.
Proposition 3 Suppose a mechanism is GSP , allocates at most one unit of good at any utility profile and does not exclude ex-ante any agent, then the mechanism is welfare equivalent to a priority mechanism.
Notice this proposition is independent of the tie-breaking rule. In particular, it shows that when there is only one unit of good, a subclass of the feasible sequential mechanisms are the only GSP mechanisms that do not exclude ex-ante any agent.
The priority mechanisms are especially compelling when randomizations are disallowed. Give priority to the agents is natural in multiple settings. For instance, when allocating a scarce drug to sick people, priority is often given to the sicker people.
If randomization are allowed, many more interesting mechanisms emerge. For instance, the mechanism that allocates each object to the agents for free with probability 1 n is GSP and always allocates the object. This mechanism also satisfy ETE.
Feasible cost-sharing mechanisms
A cost-sharing function is a non-negative function C : 2 N → R + such that C(S) ≤ C(T ) for S ⊆ T. It specifies the cost of serving every coalition of agents.
We say a mechanism (G, ϕ) is feasible for the cost-sharing function C if i∈G(u) ϕ i (G(u)) ≥ C(G(u)) for all utility profiles u. A feasible mechanism collects at least the cost of serving the agents G(u) at every utility profile u.
A mechanism is budget-balanced if the cost is exactly collected at every utility profile u. That is, i∈G(u) ϕ i (G(u)) = C(G(u)) for all u.
Given an arbitrary cost function, there exists sequential and cross-monotonic mechanism that are feasible. Indeed, any large enough homothetic expansion of the set of payments would lead to a feasible mechanism. For instance, for the cross-monotonic set of cost-shares, χ, consider the cross monotonic set of cost-shares λ · χ = {λ · x S |x S ∈ χ} for some λ > 0. While we can always find a λ that makes the set of cost-shares λ · χ feasible for any cost function C, such mechanism could be very wasteful (charge the agents too much).
Recent literature deals with the role of wastefulness. In particular, the companion paper Juarez [10] characterizes optimal mechanisms (using the worse absolute surplus loss) for an arbitrary symmetric cost function. When the cost function has decreasing average cost, Theorem 1 in Juarez [2011] shows that the optimal GSP mechanism would be the cross-monotonic mechanism where x S i = AC(S) for all i ∈ S.
11 On the other hand, the optimal mechanism for a cost function with decreasing marginal cost would be a sequential mechanism.
Cross-monotonic mechanisms
Moulin [1999] shows that in the space of submodular cost functions, any mechanism that is budget-balanced, GSP and satisfies a strong consumer sovereignty condition should be implemented as a cross-monotonic mechanism for a set of cross-monotonic and budgetbalanced cost shares. The result proposed by Theorem 1 is more general. We show that crossmonotonic mechanisms emerge simply from the combination of GSP and M AX. However, as shown in example 7, this does not imply the cost sharing function defined by C(S) = i∈S x S i is submodular. Hence we capture Moulin's mechanisms and a few more. , is not increasing as coalition increases.
It is easy to see that the monotonicity of AC does not imply the submodularity of C. Hence, there are cross-monotonic set of cost shares whose associated cost function is not concave.
In the space of cross-monotonic set of cost shares under equal-sharing, 12 the cost function generated by the mechanism is such that the average cost function AC is not increasing.
The problem of finding the cost function generated by an arbitrary cross-monotonic set of cost-shares is a difficult problem. Sprumont[1990] and Norde et al. [2002] provide characterizations of these cost functions in simple cases.
Sequential mechanisms
Sequential mechanisms are related to the incremental cost mechanisms of Moulin[1999] . That is, consider a supermodular (convex) cost function and a sequential tree. Start with the agent i 1 in the root and offer him a unit of good at price C(i 1 ). If he buys, continue with the agent i 2 on the right of the tree and offer him a unit of good at price C(i 1 , i 2 ) − C(i 1 ). If i 1 did not buy, then offer the agent on the left of the tree, k 2 , a unit of good at price C(k 2 ). Proceed similarly with the following agents until you reach the end of the tree.
Theorem 1 in Moulin [1999] suggests that incremental cost mechanisms are GSP mechanisms when the cost function is supermodular. However, this is not true, as shown on the next example.
Example 8 Consider the supermodular cost function:
By choosing the ordering 1 2 3, the cost shares are as follows:
What is important from Moulin[1999] is that incremental cost mechanism may not be fully GSP , but they are GSP except when agents are indifferent between getting and not getting a unit of good. Thus the mistake is very tiny.
Whenever the supermodular cost function and the ordering of the agents give a sequential mechanism that is feasible, it must be captured by a sequential mechanism discussed above.
On the other hand, given a feasible sequential mechanism, the associated budget balance cost function (the cost of S defined as the sum of the payments when S is served) may not be supermodular. Therefore, feasible sequential mechanisms capture even more mechanism than those generated by the incremental cost mechanisms.
Given the difficulty to describe the class of feasible sequential mechanisms, it is nearly impossible to describe the class of cost functions that are generated by arbitrary feasible sequential mechanisms. The exception to this difficulty comes when we restrict the attention to feasible sequential mechanisms under equal-sharing. The typical cost functions (up to renaming the agents) can be described by:
Notice even these types of cost functions might not be supermodular. Indeed, we can easily find values such that C(1, 3) + C(2, 3) = 2a 1 + 2a 2 > 3a 1 + a 3 = C(1, 2, 3) + C(3).
The feasible sequential mechanism for this cost function is shown in figure 6 for five agents.
Conclusions
This paper characterizes the GSP mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions. On one hand, cross-monotonic mechanisms are characterized by GSP and M AX. These mechanisms are very useful when symmetry is required. However, they are very inefficient when there is scarcity of the good.
On the other hand, sequential mechanisms are characterized by GSP and M IN . These mechanisms are appropriate when there is scarcity of the good, for instance when there is only one unit of good available. Unfortunately, deterministic sequential mechanisms fail standard equity such as equal treatment of equals.
Group strategyproof mechanisms without any of the two alternative continuity conditions can be easily constructed, for instance some priority compositions of sequential an cross monotonic mechanism are GSP (see Juarez[2007b] or Roughgarden[2007] ). However, the full characterization of GSP mechanisms in this economy is an open question.
Proofs Proof of Theorem 2.
Feasible sequential mechanisms meet M IN and GSP .
Feasible sequential mechanisms trivially meet M IN.
We prove by contradiction these mechanisms meet GSP . Assume coalition S profitably misreports u S at the true profile u. Let k ∈ S be an agent who strictly increases his net utility by misreporting. Let ζ and ζ be the nodes that contain agent k in the paths that generate G(u) and G( u S , u − S ) respectively.
First notice ζ is on the left of ζ . To see this, let i * be the agent in the terminal node of P 0 (ζ) P 0 (ζ ). Then, in order to move from P 0 (ζ) to P 0 (ζ ), agent i * misreports. If i * is winning in P 0 (ζ) then by M IN his net utility is positive, so he will never agree to move to P 0 (ζ ) because he is not served there.
Let L and R be as in definition 9. Since agent k strictly increases his net utility, then x L k > x R k . Assume condition (a) of feasibility is satisfied. That is, there exist nodes ζ andζ that contain the same agent i such that ζ is losing in L,ζ is winning in R and x
. Thus, for the path P 0 (ζ ) to realize, i ∈ S and u i > x R i . Hence the net utility of agent i is negative when he misreports because u i < x R i . This is a contradiction.
On the other hand, assume condition (b) of feasibility is satisfied. That is, there exist nodes ζ andζ that contain the same agent i such that ζ is winning in L,ζ is losing in R and
. Thus, for the path P 0 (ζ ) to realize, i ∈ S and u i ≤ x R i . Hence, the net utility of agent i strictly decreases from u i − x L i to zero when he misreports. This is a contradiction.
Any GSP and M IN mechanism is a feasible sequential mechanism.
Let (G, ϕ) a mechanism that meets GSP and M IN . Steps 1, 2 and 3 are three preliminary properties of (G, ϕ). Steps 4 and 5 prove (G, ϕ) is a sequential mechanism.
Step 6 proves it is a feasible sequential mechanism.
Step 1.
If G(u) = S * and ϕ(u) = ϕ * , then for all u such that u S * >> ϕ S * and u N \S * ≤ u N \S * , G( u) = S * and ϕ( u) = ϕ * . Proof. First notice that by M IN, an agent gets positive net utility if and only if he is served.
, then agent i misreports u i when the true profile is ( u i , u −i ), which contradicts SP. On the other hand, if i ∈ G( u i , u −i ) and ϕ i ( u i , u −i ) < ϕ * i , then agent i misreports u i when the true profile is u, which also contradicts SP. Therefore, i ∈ G( u i , u −i ) and
, then agent i helps j by misreporting u i when the true profile is u. This contradicts GSP. The case
By applying the previous argument to each agent in S * , we have that G( u S * , u −S * ) = S * and ϕ( u S * , u −S * ) = ϕ * . Let j ∈ S * . Then G( u S * ∪j , u −S * ∪j ) = S * and ϕ( u S * ∪j , u −S * ∪j ) = ϕ * . First notice that j ∈ G( u S * ∪j , u −S * ∪j ), otherwise by voluntary participation
Thus agent j misreports u j when true profile is ( u S * , u −S * ). This contradicts SP .
On the other hand, if N U k ( u S * ∪j , u −(S * ∪j) ) < N U k ( u S * , u −S * ) for some k = j, then agent j helps k by reporting u j when true profile is ( u S * , u −S * ), this contradicts GSP . Similarly,
By repeatedly using the previous argument to every agent in N \ S * , we have that G( u) = S * and ϕ( u) = ϕ * .
Step 2.
(where max and min are taken coordinate by coordinate).
By step 1, comparingv and u, G(v) = S * and ϕ(v) = ϕ(u). Similarly, comparingv and u, ϕ(v) = ϕ( u).
By step 2, there exist at most one vector of payments for every coalition. Let x S * be the payment of coalition S * when S * is served at some profile.
Step 3. Let u be such that G(u) = S * and ϕ(u) = ϕ * . Then for every i ∈ S * and
j then agent i can help j by misreporting u i when the true profile is (ϕ * i , u −i ) : By M IN, agent i is not being served at the profile (ϕ * i , u −i ), thus he is indifferent between misreporting u i and getting a unit at price ϕ * i , or truly reporting ϕ * i and not getting a unit, whereby agent j is better of at u. This contradicts GSP .
Finally, since i ∈ G(ϕ * i , u −i ) and by step 1, G(u *
Step 3.1 If G(u) = S * , then for any T, T ⊂ S * , there exist u such that G( u) = T and x Step 4. Assume there is u * such that G(u * ) = N. Then, there is an agent to whom is offered a unit of good at a price that is independent of the utilities of the other agents (we say this agent has priority).
We prove this by induction in the size of N. If N = {1} then the GSP and M IN mechanisms are clearly fixed cost mechanisms. That is, there is a fixed price x, x ∈ [0, ∞] such that if u 1 > x then 1 is served at price x. If u 1 ≤ x then he is not served.
For the induction hypothesis, assume that for any GSP and M IN mechanism for n − 1 agents there is an agent who has priority. Let (G, ϕ) be a mechanism for the agents in N = {1, . . . , n}.
For every j, consider the utility profiles where agent j has zero utility, that is
By M IN, agent j is not being served at any profile of U j . Thus, the restriction of (G, ϕ) to U j defines a M IN and GSP mechanism for the agents in N \ j. Let ρ j = {x S | j ∈ S} be the set of payments in this mechanism. Notice because N is being served, then by step 3.1 every coalition S ⊂ N is being served. In particular ρ j contains a payment for every group of agents that does not contain agent j. Also, notice that by step 2 if . Similarly, there is an agent who has priority on ρ i 1 . Call
. We continue this procedure until we reach a cycle. Without loss of generality, we assume the cycle is i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k . This means i j+1 has priority on ρ i j for j = 1, . . . , k − 1, and i 1 has priority on ρ i k .
Case 1. The cycle has size less than n, that is k < n.
Notice that for every u ∈ U, N \{i 1 , i 2 , . .
By steps 1 and
By step 3.1, for every coalition T such that N \ {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k } ⊂ T, there is u ∈ U such that G( u) = T. This is clear because coalition N is being served at some profile of U, so we can reduce (one agent at a time) the utility of the agents not in T to zero.
Clearly, the mechanism restricted to U defines a GSP mechanism for the agents in {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k }. By the induction hypothesis, there is an agent who has priority, say i 1 . Thus, x
. On the other hand, because i 1 has priority on ρ i k , x
Hence by the monotonicity of the payments x
Finally, we prove agent i 1 has priority. Assume there is u such that u i 1 > x
, u −i 1 ) and max is taken coordinate by coordinate. By step 1, G(u i 1 ,ũ −i 1 ) = N. By step 1 and 3, N \ {i 2 } ⊆ G(u i 1 , u i 2 ,ũ −i 1 ,i 2 ). Similarly, by steps 1 and 3, N \ {i 2 
. Continuing this way, {i 1 } ⊆ G(u). This is a contradiction.
Case 2. The cycle has size n, that is k = n.
Without loss of generality, assume agent 2 has priority over N \ 1, agent 3 has priority over N \ 2, . . . , etc. Thus,
Also, assume to get a contradiction, that there is no agent who has priority. That is, Step 5. Assume there is no u such that G(u) = N. If the mechanism is not trivial (G(u) = ∅ for some u), there is an agent who has finite priority. That is, there is an agent i * and a payment x
First notice there is a group of agents S * who has priority. That is, for all u such that u S * ≥ x S * S * , G( u) = S * . To see this, consider u such that u >> x T for all possible payments x T , x T = ϕ(v) for some v (we know by step 2 that there is at most one vector of payments for every coalition, thus it is feasible to choose such u). Let S * be such that G( u) = S * . Notice that, for any i, i ∈ S * , G( u −i ,v i ) = S * for allv i . Indeed, ifv i ≤ u i then by step 1 i ∈ G( u −i ,v i ). On the other hand, ifv i > u i , then i ∈ G( u −i ,v i ). This is easy to see by contradiction, assume i ∈ G( u −i ,v i ), then by the choice of u, ϕ i ( u −i ,v i ) < u i <v i . Therefore, by step 1, i ∈ G( u), which is a contradiction.
Hence, G( u −i ,v i ) = S * for allv i . Thus, by changing the utilities of the agents in N \ S * one at a time, G( u S * , u −S * ) = S * . Hence by step 1, G(ū S * , u −S * ) = S * for allū S * ≥ x S * S * and all u −S * .
We now prove step 5 by induction. For n = 1, if G(u) = 1 for all u then clearly the mechanism is trivial (G(u) = ∅ for all u). So the claim is true.
For the induction hypothesis, assume the claim is true for any mechanism of n − 1 agents. We prove it for any mechanism of n agents.
Let S * be defined as above and j ∈ S * . Consider the restriction of the mechanism to U j = {u ∈ R N + | u j = 0}. Then this restriction is a GSP and M IN mechanism for the agents in N \ j. By induction and step 4, there is an agent i * who has (finite) priority for the agents N \ j. Clearly i * ∈ S * , otherwise his payment is dependent on the agents in S * . We now prove by contradiction that for any profile u −i * , i * has priority. Assume there is u such that f i * (u −i * ) = x S * i * , where f i * (u −i * ) is the price of a unit of good that the mechanism makes to agent i * when the utilities of the other agents are u −i * (recall this function exists because the mechanism meets SP , V P and N N T ). Let u i * =ũ i * , a utility bigger than all possible payments for agent i * , in particular u i * > x S * i * . First notice that j ∈ G(u), otherwise, by step 1 G(u) = G(0, u −j ) and ϕ(u) = ϕ(0, u −j ). Thus i * is served at u at a price equal to x S * i * , which contradictions our assumptions. Hence j ∈ G(u). By step 3,
By repeatedly using the above argument to every agent in S * \ i * we conclude that
This contradicts the priority of coalition S * .
Steps 4 and 5 showed that for any GSP and M IN mechanism there exists an agent whose payment is independent of the other agent's utilities. By induction, this clearly implies the mechanism is sequential.
Step 6. The mechanism is implemented by a feasible sequential tree. Proof. Given a sequential mechanism (definition 7) that meets GSP and M IN , we show by contradiction that this mechanism is feasible (as in definition 9).
Assume the sequential tree that implements this mechanism is not feasible. Let ζ and ζ be two achievable 13 nodes that contain the same agent k such that x L k > x R k , and for every two nodesζ ∈ L andζ ∈ R that contains the same agent i, one of the next conditions hold:
2.ζ is winning in L andζ is losing in R and x
13 That is, all winning agents in their paths to the root of the tree have finite prices 3.ζ andζ are losing in L and R.
4.ζ andζ are winning in L and R.
Let i * be the agent in the terminal node of P 0 (ζ) P 0 (ζ ). Fix a utility profile u such that:
a. u i * equal the price of his node.
e. u i = 0 if condition 3 holds.
g. If j is unique winning agent in (P 0 (ζ) P 0 (ζ )) \ (L R) then u j is bigger than the price of its node.
i. Any other agent has zero utility.
First notice the profile u realizes the path P 0 (ζ).
If an agent is losing in P 0 (ζ) then either his utility equals to zero, or condition 1 is satisfied, or he is i * . If his utility equals to zero, by M IN he is not served. If condition 1 is satisfied then u i = x R i ≤ x L i so he is not served. If he is i * , then his utility equal the price of his node, so he is not served.
On the other hand, if an agent is winning in P 0 (ζ) then his utility is bigger than the price of his node. To see this, if condition 2 is satisfied then by part d he is served. If condition 4 is satisfied, then by part f he is served. The remaining winning agents are served by part g.
Let T be the common agents who meet condition 1 and S = T ∪ {i * , k}. We now check that when the true profile is u, coalition S can profitably misreport. First notice all agents in S are not being served at u, so they get zero net utility.
Let u S be such that:
• u k = u k Then at the profile ( u S , u −S ) the path P 0 (ζ ) realizes. Indeed, an agent j whose node is in (P 0 (ζ) P 0 (ζ )) \ (L R) is obviously served if winning and not served of losing. If i meets condition 2, then
, so he is not served. If i meets condition 3, then by e his utility equals zero, thus he is not served. If i meets condition 4, then by f his utility is bigger than x R i , thus he is served. Also, i * is winning and he is served at a price equal to his true valuation u i , thus his net utility is zero. If i ∈ T , that is i ∈ L R is winning in R, then he is being served at a price equal to his valuation because u i > u i = x R i , thus his net utility is zero. Finally, agent k is being served at a price x R k , u k > x R k . Hence his net utility increases by misreporting.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Cross-monotonic mechanisms meet M AX and GSP .
Cross-monotonic mechanisms clearly meet M AX. We prove by contradiction that these mechanisms meet GSP . Consider the crossmonotonic mechanism generated by the cross monotonic set of cost shares {x S | S ⊆ N }. Consider the offer function f i (u −i ), the price agent i should pay to get a unit of good when the utilities of the remaining agents are
where S * is the maximal reachable coalition at (∞, u −i ). By cross-monotonicity of the cost shares and the definition of f i , the offer function does not increase when u −i increases. That is, if
Furthermore, the set of offer functions f 1 , . . . , f n generate precisely the mechanism (G, ϕ). That is, G(u) = S * if and only if u i ≥ f i (u −i ) for all i ∈ S * and u j < f j (u −j ) for all j ∈ S * . Indeed, to prove the only if part, assume G(u) = S * . Let i ∈ S * , since S * is the maximal reachable coalition at u, then by cross monotonicity S * is the maximal reachable coalition at (∞, u −i ), thus f i (u −i ) = x S * i ≤ u i . Let j ∈ S * and T the maximal reachable coalition at (∞, u −j ). To get a contradiction, assume that u j ≥ x T j = f j (u −j ). Then T is reachable at u, thus T ⊆ S * . Furthermore, since j ∈ T, then j ∈ S * , which is a contradiction. We now prove the if part. Let T be the maximal reachable coalition at (∞, u −i ) and assume u i ≥ f i (u −i ) = x T i . Then i ∈ T and T is reachable at u. Thus T ⊆ G(u), hence i ∈ G(u). On the other hand, let T be the maximal reachable coalition at (∞, u −j ) and assume
To get a contradiction, assume that j ∈ G(u). Then by monotonicity,
, which contradicts our initial assumptions. Assume coalition S profitably misreports u S when the true profile is u. Letv S = max(u S , u S ), where max is taken coordinate by coordinate. Because the offer function does not increase, coalition S also profits from misreportingv S when the true profile is u.
By monotonicity of the offer function, G(u) ⊆ G(v S , u − S ). Since coalition S profits from misreporting, then G(u) G(v S , u − S ). Since G(v S , u − S ) is not reachable at u, then there is
. Clearly i ∈ S would contradict voluntary participation. Thus i ∈ S, hence i is worse off by misreporting, which is a contradiction.
We show next that these situations cannot occur.
Letv j be such thatv j > u j . By step 0,
Therefore, when the true profile is ( u i ,v j , u −ij ), agent i can help j by misreporting u i : Agent i is served in both profiles at price f i (v j , u −ij ), however agent j is offered a unit at the cheaper price f j (u −j ) when i misreports. This contradicts GSP .
. So, we are in exactly in the previous case but switching the role of u i and u i . Thus, this case cannot occur.
By repeatedly using step 1.1 to every agent in S * we have that G( u S * , u −S * ) = S * and ϕ( u S * , u −S * ) = ϕ * .
Step 1.2. Let j ∈ S * be such thatũ j < u j . Then G( u S * ∪j , u −S * ∪j ) = S * and ϕ( u S * ∪j , u −S * ∪j ) = ϕ * . Since u j < u j < f j ( u S * , u −S * ∪j ), then by SP j ∈ G( u j , u S * , u −S * ∪j ). Similarly to step 1.1,
We show next these cases cannot occur.
Letv k be such thatv k > u k . By monotonicity
First we assume that
Then, when the true profile is (v k , u j , u S * \k , u −S * ∪j ), agent j can help agent k by misreporting u j : Agent j does not get a unit in either profile, however by equation 3 agent k gets a unit at the cheaper price f k (u j , u S * \k , u −S * ∪j ) when j misreports. This contradicts GSP.
On the other hand, we now assume
Letv j be such thatv j > u j . By step 1,
Thus when true profile is ( u k ,v j , u S * \k , u −S * ∪j ), agent k helps j by misreportingv k : By equation 5, agent k is served at a price f k (v j , u S * \k , u −S * ∪j ) in either profile; however by equation 4 agent j is served at the cheaper price f j (v k , u S * \k , u −S * ∪j ) when k misreports. This contradicts GSP.
Hence
However, this contradicts monotonicity because u j < u j . By repeating step 1.2 to every agent in
By step 1, comparingv and u, G(v) = S * and ϕ(v) = ϕ(u). Similarly, comparingv and u, ϕ(v) = ϕ( u). Hence ϕ(u) = ϕ( u).
Step 3.
In this final step we prove the theorem by induction on the number of agents. The base of induction is the case n = 1. The mechanisms are easy to construct. Given x) . On the other hand, if u 1 < x then (G, ϕ)(u 1 ) = (∅, 0). These mechanisms are clearly cross-monotonic.
For the induction hypothesis, assume that any GSP and M AX mechanism for k agents, k < n, is cross-monotonic. We prove this for the n−agent case. Let (G, ϕ) be a GSP and M AX mechanism defined for the agents N = {1, . . . , n}. Case 1. Assume there is a utility profile u * such that G(u * ) = N. Let x N = ϕ(u * ). By step 1, for all u ≥ x N , G( u) = N and ϕ( u) = x N . For every agent j ∈ N, consider the set of utility profiles such that u j = 0, that is
By induction, there is a cross-monotonic mechanism (G j , ϕ j ) for N \ j agents defined on
Letρ j be the cross-monotonic set of cost shares that defines this mechanisms.
Let S * , S * ⊆ N \ j, be the maximal coalition that is served by (S j , ϕ j ) under any utility profile of N \ j agents (by cross-monotonicity this coalition exists).
For every T ⊆ N \ j consider the vector of cost shares y T as follows:
* ∩ T and T ⊆ S * ; where x S * ∈ρ j . Letρ j be the set of these cost shares. Clearly, if S * = N \ j, thenρ j =ρ j . If S * = N \ j, this may not be true, however it generates the same cross-monotonic mechanism (S j , ϕ j ) (see below). First, we show thatρ j is a cross-monotonic set of cost shares. Indeed, consider
Moreover,ρ j coincides with ρ j for any subset in 2 S * , and G j (v) is the maximal reachable coalition in ρ j for the utility profile v. Hence, G j (v) is the maximal reachable coalition inρ j for the utility profile v. Let ρ j be the embedding ofρ j into U j by adding a j−th coordinate equal to zero. We define the cost share of coalition T, T N as
where max is taken coordinate by coordinate. The cost share of coalition N is simply x N . Let ρ * be the set that contains these cost shares. We first check that if G(u) =S = N for some u, then ϕ(u) =xS. Indeed, by step 1 for any j ∈ N \S, ϕ(u) = ϕ(0, u −j ) = xS where xS ∈ ρ j . Thus for any i, j ∈ N \S, xS = ϕ(u) = yS where xS ∈ ρ j and yS ∈ ρ i . Furthermore,xS = xS where xS ∈ ρ j . Hence ϕ(u) =xS. We now show ρ * is a cross-monotonic set of cost shares. Let S ⊂ T N and k ∈ S. First notice that x S k ≥ x T k holds for any i ∈ N \ T, x S , x T ∈ ρ i by cross-monotonicity on ρ i . By taking max on both sides of the inequality and maximizing over all agent in N \ T,x
We now check that
To prove the above claim by contradiction, assume there is i ∈ S * such thatx
On the other hand, by step 0,
This is a contradiction.
In particular, cross-monotonicity implies that agent i cannot be served if his utility is smaller than x N i . Hence, the mechanism (G, ϕ) satisfies:
• If for some i,
Finally, we check (G, ϕ) is the cross-monotonic mechanism generated by ρ * . If u ≥ x N , then G(u) = N and obviously N is the maximal reachable coalition in ρ * . Assume u is such that u i < x N i for some agent i. Let S * = G(u). By cross-monotonicity, no coalition that contains agent i is reachable at u. On the other hand, since (G i , ϕ i ) is cross-monotonic, then S * = G i (u N \i ) is the maximal reachable coalition in ρ i and payments are x S * ∈ ρ i . Hence S * is the maximal reachable coalition in ρ * because x S * = x S * ∈ ρ * , and y T ≥ x T for all x T ∈ ρ i and y T ∈ ρ * .
Case 2. Assume there is no u * such that G(u * ) = N. We will show there is j ∈ N such that j ∈ G( u) for all u. We prove this by contradiction. Assume for any j there is u j such that j ∈ G(u j ). Letv = max(u 1 , . . . , u n ) where max is taken coordinate by coordinate. By step 0, atv every agent j is offered a unit of good at price not bigger than u j j , thus j ∈ G(v) for all j ∈ N. This is a contradiction. Since there is an agent who is not serviced at any profile, say agent j * , then by step 1 (G, ϕ)(u) = (G, ϕ)(u −j * , 0) for all u. Hence by induction the mechanism is cross-monotonic.
Proof of Corollary 1.
If the mechanism meets GSP and M IN (M AX), then for every agent i his payment does not decrease (increase) when coalition increases.
Therefore, in order to have a common point at every coalition, it must be that x for all i. Hence, the cost share of agent i is fixed.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Recall that 1 N = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R N + . For a non-negative number x, let x · 1 N = (x, . . . , x) ∈ R N + .
The proof of Proposition 1 is divided in cases 1 and 2.
By ET E, G(x · 1 N ) = N or G(x · 1 N ) = ∅ for all x ≥ 0, since all the agents should either be served or not served at a symmetric utility profile. Proof.
Step 1.1. If N U k (u) = 0 for all u ∈ R N + and k ∈ N, then G(u) = ∅ for all u ∈ R N + . Proof. If N U k (u) = 0 but G(u) = S = ∅ for some utility profile u then ϕ i (u) = u i for all i ∈ S. Thus by SP, for k ∈ S and v k > u k : k ∈ G(v k , u −k ) and ϕ k (v k , u −k ) = u k , thus N U k (v k , u −k ) > 0. This is a contradiction.
Step 1.2. Assume G(x · 1 N ) = ∅ for all x > 0, then N U (u) = 0 for all u ∈ R N + . Proof. Assume there is an agent k such that N U k (u) > 0 at some utility profile u. Let u max = max(u 1 , . . . , u n ) · 1 N . Then, G(u max ) = ∅. Thus, when the true profile is u max , agents in N help k by misreporting u : Agent k is strictly better off because he is getting a unit at a price below u k , while any other agent j may or may not get a unit at a price less than or equal to u j . This contradicts GSP.
Steps 1.1 and 1.2 prove case 1.
Case 2. If there exists x * ≥ 0 such that G(x * · 1 N ) = N, then (G, ϕ) is welfare equivalent to a cross-monotonic mechanism that satisfy equal-sharing.
Proof. By ETE, there exists y * ≥ 0 such that ϕ i (x * · 1 N ) = y * for all i ∈ N. The rest of the proof of this case is divided in steps 2.1, 3 and 4.
Step 2. We finish the proof of case 2 by induction in the number of agents. We assume that any ETE mechanism for less than n agents is welfare equivalent to a cross-monotonic mechanism that satisfy equal sharing. We will prove it for a mechanism for n agents. We will divide the proof in steps 3 and 4 (and several cases in between).
Step 3. If an agent is served, he will not pay more than y * at any utility profile. That is, if i ∈ G(u * ) for some u * ∈ R * + then ϕ i (u * ) ≥ y * .
Proof. We will prove this step by analyzing cases 3.1 and 3.2.
Case 3.1. G(u * ) = N.
In order to derive a contradiction, we assume that ϕ i (u * ) < y * for some agent i. Without loss of generality, also assume that j ∈ G(u * ) and ϕ i (u * ) < u * i , so agent i gets a positive net utility at u * .
14 Consider the profile u = (0, u * −j ). Then by GSP, i ∈ G( u) and ϕ i ( u) = ϕ i (u * ). Otherwise, j would help i by reporting the profile that give i higher utility.
Let U j = {u ∈ R N |u j = 0} be the set of utility profiles where agent j has utility zero. By induction, the restriction of the mechanism to U j is welfare equivalent to a cross-monotonic mechanism for N \ j agents that satisfies equal sharing.
Since u ∈ U j and i ∈ G( u) and the mechanism restricted to U j is cross-monotonic with equal sharing, then we can find a utility profile w ∈ U j such that w ≥ u and G(w) = N \ j and ϕ i (w) ≤ ϕ i ( u) = ϕ i (u * ) < y * . Let In order to derive a contradiction, we assume that ϕ i (u * ) < y * for some agent i. If agent i ∈ G(u * ) is such that ϕ j (u * ) = u
